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Switzerland is one of the most non-centralized countries in the world. A groining literature is examining
the economic effects of tax competition between the 26 Swiss cantons. Despite the relative success of Swiss
federalism, most federal countries follow the principles of coordinated rather than competitive federalism.
We identify the institutional preconditions for well-functioning competitive federalism in Switzerland.
The second part deals with the applicability of the Swiss experience for emerging economies in Latin
America. The analysis recognizes that most institutions identified to be crucial in the Swiss case are
missing in Latin America. This leads to the policy conclusion that competitive federalism can only produce
its positive effects under certain institutional circumstances. These circumstances are often not considered
when introducing lax competition in emerging economies.
1 here is growing evidence that the organization of the state matters.
The effects of fiscal federalism and decentralization are not only discussed
with respect to the European Union but also to the emerging economies
all over the world.1 Wallace E. Oates puts it this way: "In the developing
world, we. . . see widespread interest in fiscal decentralization with the
objective of breaking the grip of central planning that, in the view of many,
has failed to bring these nations onto a path of self-sustaining growth."2
The key question is: How should the functions of the state be distributed
to different orders or levels of government in order to achieve an optimal
division of public duties? However, no consensus about the optimal level of
decentralization has emerged up to now, neither theoretically nor
empirically. In particular, there is a lack of econometric research comparing
states with different degrees of decentralization. Although studies of this
kind could improve our understanding of the overall effects of
AUTHORS' NOTE: We would like to thank Peter Beez, Reiner Eichenberger, Georg v. Graevenitz, Bruno
Jeilziner, Henner Kleinewefers and three anonymous referees and the participants of the "Federalism"
session at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA),
18-20 October 2001 in Montevideo, for helpful comments.
'See, for example, Kiichiro Fukasaku and Luiz R. De Mellojr., eds., l^a decentralisation budgetaire dans
Us economies emergentes: problhnes de gestion des affaires publiques (Paris: Centre de Developpement de
1'Organisation de Cooperation et de Developpement Economiques, 1999) and Vito Tanzi, Pitfalls on the
Road to Fiscal Decentralization (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment Working Paper Nr. 19, 2001).
''Wallace E. Oates, "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," fournal of Economic Literature37 (September 1999):
1120.
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decentralization, the operationalization of federalism remains the key
problem. Consequently, it seems reasonable to analyze the experience of
single decentralized countries in order to learn more about the conditions
and effects of fiscal federalism. As one of the most non<entralized countries,
Switzerland appears to be a natural object for this kind of research.
For a better understanding, we first provide some details about the Swiss
fiscal constitution. Switzerland consists of three orders of government: the
federal government, 26 cantons, and nearly 3,000 local government units.
Nine cantons account for less than 100,000 inhabitants, the smallest canton
having only 15,000 people. Cantons and local jurisdictions are provided
with considerable fiscal competences.3 Thus, almost 75 percent of the total
tax burden on personal and corporate income consists of cantonal and
local taxes. Swiss municipalities can levy a surcharge on cantonal direct
taxes and raise their own property taxes. Personal income taxes vary
remarkably across and within the cantons.4 As an example, a family with
two children that earns a gross income of CHF 150,000 has to pay only CHF
10,095 of cantonal and local taxes in the city of Zug, but CHF 24,255 in
Basel. These cities are located in two different cantons and within a distance
of 125 kilometers.5 The federal government relies mainly on indirect
(proportional) taxes, specific consumption taxes, a general sales tax, and
small but highly progressive income taxes. Differences between jurisdictions
are smoothed out by federal, intercantonal, and intracantonal grants and
transfers. The contributions to this mechanism are determined by the fiscal
capacity of each canton.
As the above facts indicate, the Swiss fiscal system is thoroughly non-
centralized. In the last ten years, this has led many scholars to analyze the
economic effects of tax competition in Switzerland.6 According to the
literature, there is considerable empirical evidence for generally positive
effects of fiscal federalism in Switzerland. Building on this, scholars have
recently started to study the institutional preconditions for this system. They
stress the fact that fiscal federalism does not necessarily work under all
The Swiss Constitution explicitly enumerates all the competences of the federal authorities. Cantons
and municipalities are provided with a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy in all other issues. Changes
of the Constitution are difficult because they are submitted to a referendum.
4See Lars P. Feld and Friedrich Schneider, "State and Local Taxation," International Encyclopedia of Social
and Behavioral Science, Vol. 12 Economics, eds. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001).
5Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Eidgenossisches Finanzdepartement), Index der Finanzkrafl der
Kanlonefur diejahre 2000 und 2001, 12 November 2001; http://www.efv.admin.ch/finanzen/d/oeffTina/
pdf_dateien/fk00.pdf.
6See Hansjorg Blochliger and Rene L. Frey, "Der schweizerische Foderalismus-Ein Modell fur den
institutionellen Aufbau der Europaischen Union?" Aussenwirtschaft 47 (Heft IV 1992): 515-548; Bruno S.
Frey and Iris Bohnet, "Democracy by Competition—Referenda and Federalism in Switzerland," Publius:
The Journal of Federalism 23 (Spring 1993): 71-81; Reiner Eichenberger, "The Benefits of Federalism and
the Risk of Overcentralization," Kyklos 47 (3 1994): 403-420; Gebhard Kirchgassner and Werner W.
Pommerehne, "Die Entwicklung der offendichen Finanzen in foderativen Systemen," Staatsaufgaben, ed.
Dieter Grimm (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 149-176; Werner W. Pommerehne, Gebhard Kirchgassner,
et a]., "Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition at State-Local Levels-Lessons from Switzerland,"
Developments in Local Government Finance, eds. Giancarlo Pola, George France, and Rosella Levaggi
(Cheltenham, Brookfield: Elgar, 1996), pp. 292-330; and Lars P. Feld, "Tax competition and income
redistribution: An empirical analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice 105 (1-2 2000): 125-164.
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circumstances, because institutions matter.7 Naturally, this leads us to the
question: Can the Swiss experience be a model for political strategies in the
emerging economies in Latin America and other regions of the world, or is
the institutional framework in Switzerland so singular that the Swiss
experience is of no use for political strategies in other countries?8
We will proceed as follows. The next section briefly presents die dieoretical
arguments for and against fiscal federalism from an economic point of view
and explains die difference between competitive and coordinated federalism.
The theoretical arguments are then confronted widi empirical evidence from
Switzerland. In a further step, an attempt is made to identify specific
institutions conducive to the functioning of fiscal federalism in Switzerland.
The subsequent section deals with the applicability of the Swiss experience
to emerging economies in Latin America. The analysis first recognizes that
most formal and informal institutions identified to be crucial for the
functioning of Swiss fiscal federalism are not present in Latin America. It
then examines a group of challenges for fiscal federalism in emerging
economies (i.e., internal market, informal economy, and important
differences in regional income and corruption). This leads to the policy
conclusion that fiscal federalism can only produce positive effects under
certain institutional circumstances. These circumstances are often not
considered when introducing tax competition.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Proponents of fiscal federalism argue that tax competition corresponds to
the idea of fiscal equivalence, gives local politicians more responsibility,
and leads politicians to manage their budgets more carefully and according
to the preferences of their constituents. Skeptics, however, fear a race to
the bottom and an inefficient production of public goods. In order to be
able to offer an analytical guideline for the assessment of federal institutions,
we distinguish between different kinds of fiscal federalism.
The Economic Theory of Federalism Revisited
From an economic point of view, federalism is defined as a system where
jurisdictions within a nation-state have a considerable amount of tax and
spending autonomy.9 This section very briefly deals with the most important
7See Michael Wohlgemuth and Ivan Baron Adamovich, Systemwettbewerb in der Schweiz—Ein Test/all fur
das Zusammenspiel von "Exit", "Voice" und "Loyalty" (Jena: Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von
Wirtschaftssystemen, 1999); Feld and Schneider, "State and Local Taxation"; and Reiner Eichenberger
and Gerald Hosp, "Die institutionellen Leitplanken wirkungsvollen Foderalismus—Erfahrungen aus der
Schweiz," Okonomische Aspekte des Foderalismus, eds. Peter Pernthaler and Peter BuBjager (Wien: Wilhelm
Braumuller, 2001), pp. 87-104.
8Linked to this statement is the idea that decentralization may be similar to a superior good, which
becomes more demanded when income increases. The causality seems to go the opposite way in countries
which started as federations like the United States or Switzerland.
The economic theory of federalism goes back to the famous article by Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure
Theory of Local Government Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy (October 1956): 415-426. For a
concept of federalism more focused on direct democracy see Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, The
New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping and Competing jurisdictions (Cheltenham: Elgar,
1999).
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theoretical arguments for and against fiscal federalism. As the arguments
are widely known, we will just present the key elements.
The traditional economic theory of fiscal federalism is concerned with
the provision of public services by the various orders of government and
the assignment of the proper fiscal instruments.10 Demand for public
services varies across (and within) jurisdictions. Decentralization provides
incentives and possibilities for governments to generate better knowledge
about the preferences of the people because they are closer to them. In
turn, people are closer to governments and can thus better control the
activities of politicians and bureaucrats." According to a more recent body
of literature, the positive effects of fiscal federalism are linked to the idea
of a properly functioning interjurisdictional competition. This can be
summarized as follows:
• In a federally organized system, citizens and capital have better
possibilities for "exit" from ajurisdiction than in centralist states.
Consequently, local governments are forced to be more aware
of the preferences of citizens and enterprises if they want to
prevent them from moving to other jurisdictions that offer better
packages of taxes and public services. Some authors claim that
this effect is reinforced when citizens in ajurisdiction have the
right to decide about the tax burden themselves (e.g., in
procedures of direct democracy).12
• The higher intensity of interjurisdictional competition in
federally organized states is said to produce incentives for
innovations in the political sphere. The idea is that innovations
can (and will) be tested in jurisdictions where there is demand
from the constituents and where the conditions are favorable.
Innovations that follow a "bottom-up" pattern are expected to
be cheaper and more successful than experiments imposed "top-
down."13 This argument is based on Friedrich A. von Hayek's
idea of "competition as a discovery procedure."14
Geoffrey H. Brennan and James M. Buchanan advance the hypothesis
that the overall size of the public sector "should be smaller, ceteris paribus,
the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized."15
'"Overviews are provided by Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1972) and
Wallace E. Oates, "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, " Journal of Economic Literature W)iV\\ (September 1999):
1120-1149.
"See Bruno S. Frey and Iris Bohnet, "Democracy by Competition-Referenda and Federalism in
Switzerland," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Spring 1993): 71-81.
12See Wohlgemulh and Adamovich, Systemwettbewerb in derSchweiz—Ein Testfallfur das Zusammenspiel von
"Exit", "Voice" und "(royalty, "and Eichenberger and Hosp, "Die institutionellen Leitplanken wirkungsvollen
Foderalismus-Erfahrungen aus der Schweiz," pp. 87-104.
"Ibid.
MSee Friedrich A. von Hayek, "Competition as a Discover)' Procedure," New Studies in Philosophy, Politics
and Economics, ed. Friedrich A. von Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 179-190.
15Geoffrey H. Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax-Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal
Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 185.
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Nevertheless, studies by Oates find that there seems to be no clear evidence
for diis claim. Also, as PhilipJ. Grossman shows, decentralization can reduce
government size but tax collusion may weaken this effect.16 Ernesto Stein
even observes for Latin America that decentralized governments tend to
be larger. As he points out, one interpretation can be that citizens are
more satisfied in smaller units and therefore demand more public services.17
As to the broader relationship between fiscal federalism and economic
performance, there is not much empirical evidence. However, a World
Bank study byjeff Huther and Anwar Shah finds a statistically significant
and positive correlation between fiscal federalism and political governance
quality in most cases. Of course, this does not tell us anything about the
direction in which the influence goes; that is, fiscal decentralization could
also be something like a luxury good.18
The skeptical view of fiscal federalism can be summarized in three main
arguments:
• Due to the low cost of mobility between the jurisdictions of a
federal state, citizens and capital move to places with low taxes.
According to critics of fiscal federalism, this generates a race to
the bottom as governments are forced to lower taxes continuously
until public spending cannot be financed any more. In theory,
this would lead to a complete breakdown of public services.
Closely linked to this scenario is the idea that fiscal federalism
impedes redistribution as people with higher income tend to
avoid taxes by moving to otherjurisdictions with lower taxation.19
• Fiscal federalism is often advocated for ethnically and
geographically divided societies. Skeptics fear that this will lead
to increasing claims for more autonomy, thus endangering the
unity of the federal polity. Apart from that, the division into
subnational jurisdictions is expected to produce new minority
problems. Thus, fiscal decentralization is said to be not only
inefficient but even dangerous.
• Skeptics of fiscal federalism argue that smaller jurisdictions
cannot take advantage of economies of scale. A different version
of this critique claims that smaller fiscal units are too small to be
able to survive economically.
l6See Wallace E. Oates, "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review 75
(1985): 748-757; Wallace E. Oates, "Searching for Leviathan: A Reply and Some Further Reflections,"
American Economic Review 79 (1989): 578-583; and PhilipJ. Grossman, "Fiscal Decentralization and
Government Size: An Extension," Public Choice62 (1989): 63-69.
"Ernesto Stein, "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America," Journal of Applied
EconomicsU (2 1999): 357-391
l8See Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, A Simple Measure of Good Governance and Its Application to the Debate
on the Appropriate Level of Fiscal Decentralization (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996). For an overview of
other empirical studies that go in the same direction, see Oates, "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism."
I9See Hans-Werner Sinn, "Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe," European Economic
Review34 (1990): 489-504; and Hans-Werner Sinn, "The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems
Competition.'youma/o/PuMic Economics 66 (1997): 247-274.
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We could not find empirical studies that affirm the theoretical arguments
of the skeptics of fiscal federalism. Moreover, as we will show, Switzerland
seems to contradict the critics empirically.
Competitive versus Coordinated Federalism
In the literature, multiple approaches can be found for differentiating
between alternative kinds of federalism. Scholars like Robert P. Inman and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld or Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, for example,
evaluate different forms of federalism in terms of their impact on economic
efficiency, distribution of income, political participation, and protection of
individual rights and liberties. For our purpose, we contrast competitive
with coordinated federalism.20
The notion of competitive federalism not only contains an aspect of
mobile production factors in the sense of Charles M. Tiebout, but is also
concerned with competition as a constraint for political actors.21 First of
all, it is characterized by the autonomy over taxes and public services. This
primary authority of subnadonal governments should be combined with
hard budget-constraints. According to the literature on market-preserving
federalism, hard budget-constraints mean that subnational governments
are unable to create and to borrow money unlimitedly. Furthermore, the
national government is not willing to bail out troubled regional and local
governments. Within a competitive environment, subnational governments
will be punished if they underperform in comparison to other jurisdictions.
Mobile resources will choose the "exit" option. Yingyi Qian and Gerard
Roland even state that interjurisdictional competition leads to the
endogeneous emergence of harder budget-constraints.22 Finally,
competitive federalism can only persist if the national government does
not have the competences to centralize taxes and public services because,
otherwise, the center would gradually seize the powers from the lower
jurisdictions. Charles B. Blankart has empirically shown this process for
Germany between 1950 and 1995.23 That means that centralization is only
possible if all the subnational jurisdictions unanimously decide to concede
the power to tax to the federal authorities. This makes attempts of
cartelization to avoid competition very difficult and can be conceived of as
a credible commitment by the constituent states to preserve federalism.
The main argument for coordinated federalism is the adjustment of
differences between jurisdictions. However, as compared to competitive
"See Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "Rethinking Federalism," JournalojEconomic Perspectives
11 (4 1997): 43-64 and Yingyi Quian and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving
Market \ncenii\es.," Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (4 1997): 83-92.
21See Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures," 415-426.
HSee Yingyi Qian and Gerard Roland, "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic
Review 88 (5 1998): 1143-1162 and Quian and Weingast, "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving
Market Incentives."
23See Charles B. Blankart, "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View,"
Constitutional Political Economy 11 (1 2000): 27-39.
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federalism, coordinated federalism is characterized by a higher level of
harmonization within the federation. Coordinating and bargaining are
the driving principles of this kind of federalism. If subnational governments
are not able to prevent other jurisdictions from free riding or to enforce
agreements, they will try to push competences to the federal government.
Blankart calls this process an attempt to build up a cartel on tax rates.24
Intergovernmental tax-sharing rules are signs for such cartels. In this
context, soft budget-constraints are more probable. Because subnational
governments are not completely responsible for their financial situation,
federal governments have the duty to help troubled governments. From
this point of view, coordinated federalism does not seem to be a sustainable
institutional arrangement. Table 1 summarizes the most important
differences between competitive and coordinated federalism.
Table 1
Competitive Versus Coordinated Federalism
Harmonization of tax bases and rates
Harmonization of public services
Budget constraint for lower jurisdictions
Tendency for centralization
Competitive
Federalism
Low
Low
Hard
Low
Coordinated
Federalism
High
High
Soft
High
Obviously, our sympathy is with competitive federalism. Nevertheless,
we have to stress that these two concepts of federalism describe two points
on a continuum. One extreme would be complete desintegration of the
federation; the other would be complete centralization. For the analysis of
federalism, the important question is, which principle-competition or
coordination-should be the driving force of the system.
FISCAL FEDERALISM IN SWITZERLAND
According to a considerable number of empirical studies, tax competition
in Switzerland has positive effects overall. Nevertheless, it seems that the
Swiss federal system is based on very specific institutional preconditions (e.g.,
state and local tax assignment, direct democratic elements, intergovernmental
grants, and revenue sharing, but also informal institutions).
Competitive Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland
In spite of the marked federal structure, Switzerland's internal markets
allow the free movement of capital, labor, goods, and services-not only in
theory but (largely) also in reality. Important conditions for functioning
markets (e.g., common civil and criminal laws, a common currency, or a
universal infrastructure) are provided. Given that geographical distances
2<Ibid., 37.
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are relatively small, the costs of mobility are a minor factor obstructing
movement between jurisdictions. However, the mobility of labor may be
hindered by cultural barriers because Switzerland consists of three regions
differing in language and culture. In sum, as already remarked above,
Switzerland bears the potential for very intense interjurisdictional
competition.
Of course, it is difficult to prove empirically the positive effects of fiscal
federalism enumerated in previous sections. Nevertheless, Philip J.
Grossman, Panayiotis Mavros, and Robert W. Wassmer provide evidence
that pressure from competing cities is an effective check on the technical
efficiency of governments.25 According to Hansjorg Blochliger and Rene
L. Frey, in Switzerland the incentive mechanisms work as predicted by the
theory; competition generates better information and incentives for
politicians to produce public goods not only in better accordance to the
preferences of the voters but also in a more efficient way.26 It is possible
that this is an important reason why Switzerland still has the smallest
government size in Europe (38.5 percent general government expenditures
of GDP) after Ireland (31.5 percent) in spite of a strong growth of total
government expenditures during the 1990s.27
An interesting feature of the Swiss fiscal system is that it largely
corresponds to the guidelines proposed by Richard A. Musgrave, which
sketch an optimal distribution of taxation between federal, state, and local
governments. According to Musgrave, the provision of public goods should
be decentralized as far as possible, while redistribution policies should stay
with the national authorities. With reference to taxes, federal authorities
should rely on a highly progressive income tax for redistribution reasons
and on a consumption tax if subnational jurisdictions are small. Federal
subunits (e.g., states or cantons) should levy income and consumption taxes
(if the units are large enough) and also a natural-resource tax. Finally,
municipalities should levy property taxes.28 Except for minor aspects in
income and corporate taxes, Switzerland corresponds to Musgrave's model.29
Table 2 shows this in detail. Thus, the only important difference seems to
be that municipalities can impose a surcharge on the cantonal individual
and corporate income taxes. But, in fact, this is an important difference
because it is conducive to (or even necessary for) interjurisdictional
competition. Another interesting point is that the Swiss fiscal system is not
KSee PhilipJ. Grossman, Panayiotis Mavros, and Robert W. Wassmer, "Public Sector Technical Efficiency
in Large U.S. Cities," Journal of Urban Economics 46 (1999): 278-299.
26See Blochliger and Frey, "Derschweizerische Foderalismus-Ein Modell fur den institutionellen Aufbau
der Europaischen Union?" and Gebhard Kirchgassner and Werner W. Pommerehne, "Tax Harmonization
and Tax Competition in the European Union-Lessons from Switzerland," Journal of Public Economics 61
(1996): 66-82. Here, direct democracy seems to be an important factor. See section 3.2.
^Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Eidgenossisches Finanzdepartement), Staatsquole International,
12 November 2001, http://www.admin.ch/efv/finanzen/d/intvergl/intslaq.htrn.
MSee Richard A. Musgrave, "Who Should Tax, Where and What?" Tax Assignment in Federal Countries,
ed. Charles E. McLure (Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1983), pp. 2-19.
^See Feld and Schneider, "State and Local Taxation."
Fiscal Federalism for Emerging Economies 9
the outcome of a grand design of some mastermind but has evolved in the
vertical and horizontal competition between the different jurisdictions.
Table 2
Tax Assignment
Guidelines by Musgrave Swiss Fiscal System
Federal authorities Progressive income tax and Progressive income tax,
consumption tax (if lower consumption tax (lower
jurisdictions are small) jurisdictions are small),
and corporate income tax
States / Cantons Residents' income tax Personal and corporate
income tax, inheritance
tax, and wealth tax
Local governments Property taxes and payroll Personal and corporate
taxes income tax surcharge and
property tax
It is easier to deal with the expected negative effects of fiscal federalism,
as the Swiss experience proves to be an empirical contradiction to all of
them. First of all, a variety of studies prove that the race-to-the-bottom
hypothesis is not valid for Switzerland, but that tax competition works well
in producing hard budget-constraints for politicians.
• For Switzerland, the cantonal tax burden matters for the migration
decisions of individuals with a relatively high income (above CHF
100,000). Lars P. Feld finds that persons with higher income look
at taxes and infrastructure only, and not at redistribution.
However, individuals with lower incomes do take redistribution
into account when they migrate to another canton.30
• According to Feld, there is something like a migrational
equilibrium in Switzerland. In his analysis for the years 1989
and 1990, he found that there was almost no migration between
the cantons. Moreover, Feld was unable to find sound evidence
regarding fiscally induced migration between Swiss cantons in
the 1980s and between cities from 1986 to 1994.31 However, the
share of persons with a taxable income of more than 100,000
CHF was 9.41 percent in the canton of Zug and 2.53 percent in
the canton of Jura (average: 5.47 percent), with Zug having the
lowest tax burden, Jura the highest.32 Geneva, however, proves
that taxes are not the only explanatory variable for the geographic
MSee Lars P. Feld, "Exit, Voice and Income Taxes—The Loyalty of Voters," European Journal of Political
Economy 13 (3 1997): 455-478 and Feld, "Tax competition and income redistribution: An empirical analysis
for Switzerland," 125-164.
"See Feld, "Tax competition and income redistribution: An empirical analysis for Switzerland," 134.
32See Feld, "Exit, Voice and Income Taxes-The Loyalty of Voters," 455-478.
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distribution of individuals with high income; the percentage of
people with high taxable income is important in Geneva,
although it has a relatively high tax burden.
• Tax competition in Switzerland has not led to a convergence of
the tax burden in the different cantons.33 Taking the overall tax
burden as a benchmark (index: 100), the average deviation for
the 26 cantons was 13.5 points in 1985,14.8 in 1990, and 15.3 in
1996. Also, the spread between the cantons with the highest
and the lowest tax burden remained more or less unchanged.
In 1985, it was 134 index points for the highest and 67 for the
lowest tax burden; in 1990, 146 and 58; in 1996, 136 and 55.34
• The Swiss welfare state has not collapsed. An important share
of the redistribution takes place in the cantonal and municipal
arenas.35 In fact, the proportion of transfers and subsidies in
relation to Swiss GDP has significantly grown since the 1980s.
In 1980, 13.4 percent of the GDP was redistributed; in 1990,
16.0 percent; and in 1995, 18.3 percent.36 Although Switzerland
has the smallest government size in Europe, the amount of
transfers and subventions is substantial and has not declined.
The other two arguments-"federalism has disintegrating consequences"
and "federal subunits are too smalF'-can also be dismissed for the Swiss
case. As to the first argument, the Swiss federation has been a very successful
example of the peaceful coexistence of four different cultures for at least
150 years (since the constitution of 1848). In addition, Reiner Eichenberger
and Gerald Hosp claim that a successful federal system does not only build
on ethnically different regions but also on the more intense competition
between jurisdictions with more similar cultural backgrounds. They argue
that the strengths of the Swiss federal system stem from the very fact that
there is an especially intense competition between the cantons that have
the same language and culture.37
The second argument stating that federal subunits are too small to be
efficient is only valid if the jurisdictions do not have the incentives to
"Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen show that lax competition does not unavoidably lead to convergence
in lax rales. Differences in size has a large impact on Ihe strategies of countries. Smaller countries
charge a lower tax rate in a noncooperative equilibrium than larger countries. See Ravi Kanbur and
Michael Keen, "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in
Size," American Economic Review S3 (4 1993): 877-892.
MSee Wohlgemuth and Adamovich, Systemwettbewerb in der Schweiz—Ein Test/all fur das Zusammenspiel von
"Exit", "Voice" und "l^oyally." The canton of Zug has been pursuing a radical strategy of low taxes since the
mid 1960s. Up to now, no other canton has felt obliged to do the same. Zug has been the canton with the
lowest taxes since then.
MSee Gebhard Kirchgassner and Werner W. Pommerehne, "Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition
in the European Union-Lessons from Switzerland," 66-82 and Lars P. Feld and Friedrich Schneider, "State
and Local Taxation." The same phenomenon can be observed in the United States.
^See James D. Gwartneyand Robert A. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World (Bonn: Liberales Institut,
1997), p. 178.
"See Eichenberger and Hosp, "Die institulionellen Leitplanken wirkungsvollen Foderalismus-
Erfahrungen aus der Schweiz," 87-104.
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cooperate on issues concerning more than one federal subunit. These
incentives are mainly linked to the economic openness and fiscal autonomy
of jurisdictions. Finally, the economic success of small cantons (and even
municipalities) clearly contradicts the argument that small units cannot
survive economically.38
In general, the Swiss experience seems to provide some evidence in favor
of the claimed positive effects of fiscal or competitive federalism. At the
same time, the negative effects can be mitigated or even averted. In any
case, it can be argued that an at least potentially intense interjurisdictional
(tax) competition does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the welfare
system or to an inability of the state to provide the basic public services.39
Institutions Matter
If, as we have seen above, fiscal federalism works in Switzerland, does
this automatically mean that it works everywhere else, or is the institutional
framework in Switzerland so unique that the Swiss experience cannot be
taken as an example for other countries or regions? To be able to deal with
these questions, formal and informal institutions in Switzerland considered
to be conducive to the functioning of fiscal federalism have to be analyzed.
We have identified four institutions that seem to have especially positive
effects in this respect: (1) a system of intergovernmental redistribution; (2)
a compensation mechanism for transfers paid to immigrants from other
cantons; (3) extensive elements of direct democracy giving citizens rights
of participation in local decisionmaking; and (4) "loyalty" as a consequence
of specific investments.
As we have emphasized, competition should be a key characteristic of
federalism. Nevertheless, a functioning system of intergovernmental
redistribution is important because it works as an insurance against harmful
social political disruptions. However, it should be designed carefully not to
operate against competition. Furthermore, fiscal spillovers can be reduced.
In Switzerland, economic disparities between the cantons and municipalities
are adjusted through such a system of intergovernmental redistribution.
First, the federal income tax has redistributive effects because it is designed
as a strongly progressive tax. It thus compensates the low progression of
some of the cantonal income taxes. Second, the federal government
redistributes 13 percent of the total of its income tax between the cantons
according to an index of the financial power of the 26 cantons.40 The
^Here, a clear case in point also are very small and economically very successful countries like
Luxemburg and Liechtenstein.
OTOther federally organized states as the United Slates, Canada, Australia, or Germany show similar
tendencies. Nevertheless, Switzerland can bejudged as an extreme example, as fiscal federalism is especially
marked.
"The formula for distribution is as follows: Share per Canton in CHF = 2,712828(IFC x -0.0192104) x
(Population/1000) x (SFT/1 Million). IFC stands for Index of Fiscal Capacity, SFT for Share of Federal
Tax Income for redistribution in CHF. For details see Bundesgesetz 613.1 (19.06.1959) 8, 1 and, for the
formula, Bundesverordnung 613.13 (27.11.1989) 1, 1.
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index is reviewed every two years and is composed of four variables: GDP
per capita, tax income, tax burden, and the share of mountainous areas in
the canton.41 The actual system of intergovernmental redistribution was
introduced in 1959 and has now grown complicated and intransparent.
Consequently, it is currently under reform. The idea is to establish a new
assignment of functions, to strengthen the mechanism of unconditioned
transfers, and to avoid incentives for the cantons to report their financial
power incorrectly. Third and finally, the cantons themselves manage the
redistribution among their municipalities based on their financial power.
An important element of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is the idea
that individuals move to places where they receive more transfers. In
Switzerland, a special mechanism for compensating transfers to immigrants
from other cantons works against these effects. Transfers to individuals who
have recently moved to another jurisdiction are paid by their jurisdiction
of origin for a certain time. For example, social welfare assistance is paid
by the canton of origin for two years at the rate of the canton of origin.
After that, the costs are split half between the canton of origin and of
residence over the next eight years.42 The amount which the canton of
origin has to pay is negotiated by the cantons. Therefore, cantons with
high social-welfare assistance have the incentive to deter people with a high
possibility of dependency.43 Another example can be found in the education
system. University cantons receive between CHF 9,500 and 46,000 per year
and per student from the canton where students finished school. The rates
are defined according to the faculty of enrollment of the student.44
Switzerland is well known for its system of representative democracy
combined with extensive direct democratic rights for its citizens.45 Nine
cantons decide on their tax rates in parliament; the other 17 decide on the
tax rates in referenda. Thus, voters have influence on the tax burden. Many
authors say that direct democracy has stabilizing effects on fiscal federalism.46
First, according to Feld, direct democracy is an econometrically significant
variable in explaining why high-income individuals do not move away from
cantons with a higher tax burden.47 Second, Roland Vaubel and others
claim that direct democracy works against the natural tendency of a
"'Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Eidgenossisches Finanzdepartement), Index da Finanzhraft der
Kantonefurdiejahre 2000 und 2001, 12 November 2001, htlp://www.admin.ch/efv/finanzen/d/intvergl/
intstaq.htm.
45See Bundesgesetz 851.1 (24.06.1977) 16,1.
43See Feld, "Tax Competition and Income Redistribution-An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland,"
133.
"See InterkamonaleUniversitatsvereinbarung 414.23 (20.02.1997) 12, 1.
45Direct democratic rights on the federal level are: obligatory referenda for changes in the constitution,
facultative referenda for certain issues (e.g., foreign policy), and popular initiatives where 100,000 voters
can demand constitutional changes. Every canton has its own constitution with its particular set of direct
democratic rights. Even municipalities in the same canton can differ in their direct democratic rights.
46Another institution counteracting centralization are "sunset laws" concerning the competence of
the federal authorities for certain issues. Thus, for example, the existence of the federal value added lax
and the federal income tax has to be periodically confirmed by a popular referendum.
47See Feld, "Exit, Voice and Income Taxes-The Loyalty of Voters," p. 471.
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centralization of fiscal competences in federal states.48 Thus, for example,
unlike Germany, Switzerland has not experienced a "crawling" centralization
and harmonization in the decades since World War II.49 Other studies
show similar effects for the United States.50 Third and finally, direct
democracy is said to have a mitigating effect on the absolute level of state
activity. Werner W. Pommerehne and Friedrich Schneider note that
government size in Swiss cantons with direct, democratically controlled taxes
is significantly smaller than in the remaining cantons, and Lars P. Feld and
Gebhard Kirchgassner observe lower debts in jurisdictions with elements
of direct democracy in their constitutions.31
Competition between jurisdictions in Switzerland can be perceived as a
function of the possibilities of "exit" (fiscal federalism) and "voice" (direct
democracy). According to Albert O. Hirschman, a "more solid
understanding of the conditions favoring coexistence of exit and voice is
gained by introducing the concept of loyalty."52 Loyalty understood as the
consequence of a mixture of specific investments in social networks,
reputation, and cultural factors (e.g., language) is an important barrier to
exit and thus counteracts tendencies toward a race to the bottom. Apart
from that, it is conceivable that loyalty has positive effects on the willingness
of the better off to pay transfers in smaller jurisdictional units. This may be
illustrated by the example of the canton of Geneva. Here the tax burden is
relatively high, and direct democratic rights are relatively restricted.
Nevertheless, the percentage of people with a high taxable income is
sizeable. On the other hand, Michael Wohlgemuth and Ivan Baron
Adamovich argue that federal systems as well as direct democracy are
conducive to loyalty because the preferences of the voters matter more.
This also makes citizens more aware of and more responsible for local issues.
If this is so, (fiscal) federalism and loyalty mutually reinforce each other.53
48See Roland Vaubel, Constitutional Safeguards against Centralization in Federal States: An International
Cross-Section Analysis (Universitat Mannheim, Beitrage zur Angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung: Discussion
Paper 532-95, 1995); Wohlgemuth and Adamovich, Systemwettbewerb in der Schweiz—Ein Test/all fur das
Zusammenspiel von "Exit", "Voice" und "Loyalty"; and Eichenberger and Hosp, "Die institutionellen
Leitplanken wirkungsvollen Foderalismus-Erfahrungen aus der Schweiz," 87-104. For the natural tendency
towards centralization see Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, "To Harmonize Or To Compete-
That's Not The Question," Journal of Public Economics 60 (1996): 335-349. Charles B. Blankart, Polilische
Okonomie der ZenlralisierungderStaatstdtigkeit (Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin: Discussion Paper, Economics
Series, 1998), proves this tendency for Germany between 1949 and the 1990s.
49Kirchgassner and Pommerehne, "Die Entwicklung der offentlichen Finanzen in foderativen
Systemen," p. 156.
MSee, for example, John G. Matsusaka, "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the last 30
Years," Journal of Political Economy 10 (3 1995): 587-623.
5ISee Werner W. Pommerehne and Friedrich Schneider, "Unbalanced Growth between Public and
Private Sectors: An Empirical Examination," Public Finance and Public Employment, ed. Robert H. Havemann
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), pp. 309-326; and see Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner,
"Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? Some Evidence from Swiss
Municipalities," Volksioirtschaftliche Abteilung (Universitat St. Gallen: Discussion Paper Nr.9717, 1997).
HAlbertO. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Ijryalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 77,
emphasized by the author. In the terminology of Douglass C. North "loyalty" is an informal institution as
opposed to the formal laws we have treated up to now: Douglass C. North, "institutions," Journal of Economic
Perspectivesb (1 1991): 97-112.
53See Michael Wohlgemuth and Ivan Baron Adamovich, Systemwetlbewerb in der Schweiz—Ein Testfallfur
das Zusammenspiel von "Exit", "Voice" und "Ijoyalty". Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, "Maximizing Happiness?"
German Economic Review 1 (1999): 145-167, have even found for Switzerland, that federalism and direct
democracy improve the happiness of people.
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Of course, Switzerland is no "utopia." In summary, however, the country
seems to have produced an interesting institutional setting combining
elements of exit, voice, and loyalty conducive to interjurisdictional
competition. According to standard indicators (e.g., per capita income)
and in the sense of comparative institutional analysis, Swiss federalism can
be regarded as a long-term success, even compared to its European
neighbors. Naturally, this does not mean that a simple export of the Swiss
system of fiscal federalism will have the same positive effects in other
countries. A careful analysis of the institutional setting has to be undertaken.
The next part will take some first steps in this direction.
FISCAL FEDERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA?
Many countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela, are decentralizing and increasing
democratic rights and responsibilities in the provision of public services.
For example, Gabriel Aghon and Ernesto Stein stress a trend toward
decentralization.54 Between 1985 and 1995, the degree of decentralization
in public expenditures increased by 4 percent in 14 Latin American
countries. However, in comparison to the OECD countries, Latin America
is highly centralized. In 1995, less than 15 percent of total government
expenditures were executed by subnational governments, on average, in
Latin America. The corresponding figure in industrialized countries is over
35 percent.55 Only Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia exceed the OECD
average. Even so, of course, the mere degree of decentralization does not
tell us anything about the quality of the institutional setting and the intensity
of interjurisdictional competition.
To be able to see whether the Swiss experience bears lessons for the
design of fiscal federalism in emerging economies in Latin America, we
examine whether the formal and informal institutions identified previously
are present in Latin American countries. Because of their importance in
the region, we take a closer look at Brazil and Argentina. In a second step,
we examine a group of typical institutional arrangements in emerging
economies (e.g., important differences in regional income, informal
economy, and corruption) as to their effects on fiscal federalism.
Coordinated Fiscal Federalism in Latin America
The institutions discussed previously mainly have one effect: to dampen
the negative effects of tax competition without abolishing the competition
between jurisdictions. As noted earlier, tax competition produces constraints
for politicians that result in a better package of taxes and public services.
MSee Gabriel Aghon, Decentralization fiscal en America I^atina: balance y principales desajios (Documento
preparado para la Reunion de LASA, 1997, Mimeo) and Ernesto Stein, "Fiscal Decentralization and
Government Size in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics II (2 1999): 357-391.
"The figures mentioned in this part are based on Stein, "Fiscal Decentralization and Government
Size in Latin America."
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Competition also is expected to create incentives and better possibilities
for innovation in the political sphere. Scholars like Musgrave and others
emphasize the role of cooperation and coordination in a federal system in
order to avoid the supposed race to the bottom.56 It seems that the federal
systems in the more decentralized countries of Latin America have been
designed along these lines. Ernesto Rezk, for example, emphasizes that in
Argentina, the aspect of coordination has prevailed over the idea of
interjurisdictional competition: "Revenue sharing was the preferred method
of tax coordination in the country, coparticipation becoming 'the'
intergovernmental fiscal arrangement, whereby national and subnational
levels sought to avoid tax competition among jurisdictions."57
Ricardo Varsano describes the most prominent case of tax competition
in Latin America, the state value-added tax in Brazil (ICMS), as a "fiscal
war." This bad connotation underlines apparently existing reservations
against tax competition.58 Varsano even notes: "Virtually all recent work on
tax competition in federations concludes that the last-named practice is
pernicious."59
In any case, the literature on federalism in Latin America seems to focus
mainly on the idea of federalism as some kind of cooperative or coordinated
decentralization.60 Consequently, inter- and intragovernmental redistribution
are perceived to be crucial for making federalism work. Generally, transfers
can be allocated by discretion or legal requirements. As Stein reports, a
third of the transfers in Latin America are discretionary.61 According to
Inman and Rubinfeld and to Stein, discretion and negotiation raise serious
problems in comparison to a rule-based approach.62 For example, diey doubt
that interjurisdictional Coasian bargains are effective, and they describe the
negative incentives for federal subunits. If programs of subnational
jurisdictions are not solely financed with their own revenues, there is a
tendency to overexpand the budget and to require more transfers from the
MSee Richard A. Musgrave, "Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives
11 (4 1997): 65-72.
"Ernesto Rezk, "Recent Developments on Federalism and Decentralization: Lessons from the Argentine
Experience," Paper presented at the Conference on Fiscal Decentralization, IMF Headquarters (Washington, DC:
November 2000, Mimeo), p. 4.
''The more relevant question seems to be, if value-added taxes are an adequate vehicle for tax
competition.
wRicardo Varsano, "Brazil: tax reform and the "Fiscal war" in the federation," Federations 1 (March
2001).
MSee Inman and Rubinfeld, "Rethinking Federalism." They distinguish between "cooperative" and
"democratic" federalism. As opposed to cooperative federalism, in the democratic version decisions are
taken by the majority and not unanimously. This article does not make this difference and only uses the
term cooperative federalism.
"Stein, "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America," 373.
62See Inman and Rubinfeld, "Rethinking Federalism," and Stein, "Fiscal Decentralization and
Government Size in Latin America." Also see Mariano Tommasi, Sebastian Saiegh, and Pablo Sanguinetti,
"Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," Economia 1 (2 2001): 147-
190. They provide a political-transactions theory, which shows the trade off between rigid rules and
discretional responses. For a closer look to less developed countries see Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn,
"Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Transfers in Less Developed Countries," Publius: The Journal
of Federalism^ (Winter 1994): 1-19.
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common pool; this is the well-known tragedy of the commons. Finally,
discretionary redistribution bears a high potential for political and not
economic considerations in governmental decisions on revenues. This means
that the political bargaining skills of local politicians become more important
than management skills.
In spite of Argentina normally being perceived as a rule-based federal
state, Sebastian Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi provide a list of important
criticisms regarding the tax-sharing agreement. The problems here are
very similar to the problems of discretionary regimes. Among others, Saiegh
and Tommasi criticize the existence of bailouts, induced inefficiencies in
the aggregate fiscal mix, a lack of incentives for federal subunits to produce
information, and the high complexity of the system. According to the
authors, political instability and institutional rigidities are the main reasons
for the inefficiency of Argentina's intergovernmental redistribution.
Politically, the Argentinean tax-sharing agreement can be interpreted as a
veto-game because the laws require ratification by provincial legislatures.65
Also, in Brazil, a considerable share of transfers is constitutionally mandated,
but there are some discretionary and negotiated transfers too. This makes
Brazil's system complicated and intransparent. In any case, Jose R.R. Afonso
and Luiz de Mello call for more (and not less) coordinated federalism in
order to avoid financing shortfalls at the subnational level.64
Another issue frequently discussed in the literature is the way
intergovernmental grants and transfers should be determined. Thus, it is
expected that an unconditioned redistribution allows the authorities in
federal subunits to spend the financial means according to the preferences
of the people, provided the political control of the authorities works.65
Although transfers in Argentina and Brazil are mostly unconditional, a
mixed system of delegation, earmarked grants and revenues, and forced
and unforced coparticipation have helped to build a fiscal "labyrinth" with
mutual dependencies.66 The example of Brazil shows possible harmful
effects of the earmarking of sharable revenues by the federal government.
There, the federal government has to share the revenues of the income tax
and the federal value-added tax with the subnational jurisdictions. This
has led to an increase of the enterprise payroll and earnings taxes, which
are not earmarked for sharing, with distortional effects in the labor market
and for the international competitiveness of the country.67
In Latin America, the aim of the interjurisdictional redistribution is to
produce a system of coordinated federalism. Because of this, redistribution
63See Sebastian Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, Why is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering
the labyrinth (Paper prepared for the "Conference on Modernization and Institutional Development in
Argentina", PNUD, Buenos Aires, 20-21 May 1998, Mimeo), p. 9.
"See Jose R.R. Afonso and Luiz de Mello, "Brazil: An Evolving Federation," Paper presented at the
Conference on Fiscal Decentralization, IMF Headquarters (Washington, DC: November 2000, Mimeo), p. 21.
KFor a different point of view see Richard A. Musgrave, "Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (4 1997): 65-72.
^See Saiegh and Tommasi, Why is Argentina s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth, p. 8.
"See Afonso and de Mello, "Brazil: An Evolving Federation," p. 7.
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produces wrong incentives and leads to a severe common-pool problem
and bailout scenarios. As opposed to this, Swiss federalism is focused more
on competition and fiscal equivalence; grants and transfers are understood
as means to equalize the financial power of federal subunits without
abolishing the benefits of competition. In this context, the current tax-
revenue sharing design in Switzerland is regarded as being far from perfect,
but the actual reforms are expected to take a further step into encouraging
fiscal discipline and responsibility.
To our knowledge, the Swiss mechanism for compensating transfers to
immigrants from other federal subunits is not matched by any comparable
institution in Latin America. Above all, this seems to be a question of
institutional innovation. A reason for these innovations not happening
could be either a lack of knowledge or (more probably) a question of
political enforceability (technically speaking, of a politico-economical
equilibrium). Other institutions like competitive federalism or direct-
democratic elements could help to improve the ability for innovation. On
the other hand, a mechanism like the above can only operate under certain
administrative preconditions that allow governments to track the movements
of citizens (e.g., registration of citizens and a national identity card).
Another institution supporting the functioning of fiscal federalism is
direct democracy. Since 1848, Switzerland has experienced 466 referenda
and initiatives at the federal level, not counting the innumerable plebiscites
in cantons and localities. The first reported referendum in Latin America
was held on the provisional constitution in 1812 in Chile. Since then, 88
popular votes were counted in the whole of Latin America, mainly at the
federal level.68 Recently, first signs of the introduction of more direct
democracy in Latin America can be noticed; the Province of Buenos Aires
established forms of direct democracy in 1994.69 Direct democracy is said
to give the politicians incentives for credible commitment to policies.
Especially in the subnadonal jurisdictions, it is supposed to lead to a better
control of the officials. It could be argued that as direct democracy has a
long tradition in Switzerland, the Swiss experience cannot be taken as an
example for other societies. Nevertheless, every tradition has a starting
point. Although this form of democracy does not have much tradition in
Latin America, citizens seem to have learned to deal with it where it was
introduced. However, people in Latin America learn to use their democratic
rights. Alberto Porto and Natalia Porto report that voters in municipal
elections in Argentina are sensitive to the fiscal performance of the relevant
municipal authority in the recent past.70 Nevertheless, Latin America's still
relatively young democracies have to prove to be stable. According to Marta
MSee Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy, South America: Regional votes up to
today, 12 November 2001; http://c2d.unige.ch.
raSee Alberto Porto and Natalia Porto, "Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control,"/0urna/
of Applied Economics III (1 2000): 157.
70Ibid., 135-167.
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Lagos from "Latinobarometro," an average of 20 percent of the individuals
asked in South America and Mexico would support an authoritarian
government "in certain situations" as opposed to an average of 7 percent in
the European Union.71
Last but not least, the rural exodus toward the big cities in most if not all
Latin American countries indicates that loyalty does not have the same
intensity and/or effects as in Switzerland. Perhaps the bigger regional
economic disparities in most parts of Latin America are an important factor.
It can be expected that the opportunity costs of staying in poorer areas rise
with bigger gaps in welfare between different locations. Also, as Hirschman
said, loyalty is only a "postponement of exit in spite of dissatisfaction and
qualms."72 Of course, there is a point where the expected individual gains
from migrating are higher than the benefits from loyalty. Another reason
could be that Switzerland features more cultural and language differences
than Latin American countries. It seems that loyalty can be enhanced
(among other things) by the formation of social capital, which has been
identified as substantial for economic relations, especially in developing
countries.73 Lagos identifies a lack of interpersonal trust, which is a
prerequisite for the accumulation of social capital.74
To conclude this section, we remark that the main trend at the core of
decentralization in Latin America is one toward coordination. This may be
contrasted with the elements of interjurisdictional competition that are
taken to be at the heart of fiscal federalism in Switzerland. This is where
the main positive effects of decentralization can be expected to arise. The
numerous skeptics of fiscal federalism are probably also influenced by the
poor record of coordinated federalism. Interestingly, the opponents do
not call for more competition but for recentralization.75
Challenges to Introducing Competitive Federalism
In addition to the problem of avoiding a race to the bottom, the
introduction of competitive fiscal federalism in emerging economies is
loaded with challenges. Four issues seem worth discussing: (1) the challenge
of preserving the internal markets; (2) important regional differences; (3)
the big informal economy compared to industrialized countries; and (4)
corruption.
A severe challenge to decentralization is the maintenance of the internal
markets. In this context, the literature speaks of market-preserving
federalism. For sustaining an efficient market economy, decentralized
"Marta Lagos, "Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America," Journal of Democracy 12 (1 2001): 138.
reHirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyally, p. 104. As an anonymous referee has rightly pointed out to us,
loyalty may also be influenced by geographical and climatic factors. Someone may be reluctant to leave a
high tax/low service community at the lake of Geneva for a low tax/high service community in the snowy
and mountainous canton of Uri.
73See Kurt Annen, "Inclusive and Exclusive Social Capital in the Small-Firm Sector in Developing
Countries," Journal ofInstitutional and Theoretical Economics 157 (2 2001): 319-330.
"See Lagos, "Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America," 137-145.
"See, for example, Tanzi, Pitfalls on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization.
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governments should face hard-budget constraints and have the regulatory
responsibility for the economy.76 There should be no barriers to trade. The
value-added tax levied by the federal subunits in Brazil is said to encourage
tax warfare and to impede trade between them. Nevertheless, according to
the ideas of market-preserving federalism, this kind of competition is not
necessarily harmful as long as the states get enough revenue. In particular,
if budget constraints are hard and states cannot rely on a bail out from the
federal government, they are forced to manage their budgets more carefully.
Hard budget-constraints also have other positive effects; the federal subunits
will have to be more careful when they grant subsidies to attract firms and
individuals.77 In general, the concept of market-preserving federalism seems
to neglect the role of a central authority as guardian of competition enforcing
general rules for the subnational jurisdictions.
Countries with strong regional disparities may suffer from centrifugal
forces leading to separatist movements. Of course, regional differences
are one reason for fiscal federalism where a uniform provision of public
services is not perceived to be optimal. However, large differences in income
levels exist in emerging countries. Some subnational governments can be
too poor to provide a minimum of public services. Therefore,
interjurisdictional redistribution plays a crucial role in fiscal federalism.
Tax evasion and a huge informal economy are other challenges.
Friedrich Schneider and Dominik H. Enste report that the size of the shadow
economy in developing countries is systematically larger than in the OECD
countries. In Japan, the United States, Austria, and Switzerland, the shadow
economy is estimated to amount to 8-10 percent of GDP. With 25-35 percent
of GDP, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile have bigger shadow
economies. Mexico's and Peru's shares are even estimated to be between
40-60 percent.78 A low tax compliance and high tax evasion can undermine
the ability of federal subunits to raise revenues. To solve this problem, an
improvement of tax administration is often advocated. Vito Tanzi expects
that there are economies of scale in tax administration and, consequently,
wants taxation to be centralized.79 On the other hand, there seem to be no
obstacles for federal subunits to buy services from a central tax
administration. In Switzerland, it even is the other way around; the cantonal
tax administrations collect the federal income tax. The power to tax and
not the actual collection of taxes is crucial. Another way to increase the
effectiveness of taxation could be to expand political participation. For
"See Quian and Weingast, "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," 83-92 and
Oates, "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," 1120-1149.
77A characteristic of coordinated federalism seems to be a competition between the states of who
grants higher subsidies (obtained from the federal authorities) to attract firms.
78See Friedrich Schneider and Dominik H. Enste, "Shadow Economics: Size, Causes, Consequences,"
Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (March 2000): 80. The size of the shadow economy is measured as
percent of GDP, averaged over 1990-1993. Also see Varsano, "Brazil: tax reform and the "fiscal war" in the
federation."
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example, Werner W. Pommerehne et al. show that tax evasion is lower under
the regime of direct democracy.80
The last challenge to discuss is corruption. According to Tanzi, local
institutions are less developed than national ones, especially in poor
countries. The best and most talented people join the national
government.81 In some regard, this statement is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
If the possibilities and responsibilities of subnational governments are not
strengthened, then local institutions cannot be attractive employers. In
addition, even centralized countries consist of several levels of
administration. The question is, which system offers more discretionary
power for the officials? It can also be argued that political control matters.
If the people in subnational units can exercise democratic rights, abuse of
power will be more difficult than under a pure bureaucratic hierarchy. The
final judgement depends on how one values the principal-agent relationship
between the national government and local authorities on one side and
local authorities and voters on the other side.
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
It seems fair to say that fiscal decentralization in Switzerland works as a
mechanism for controlling and constraining politicians and thus producing
political outcomes better matched to peoples' preferences. Evidence can
also be found that fiscal federalism is an important reason for the efficiency
of politics and maybe even for the relative economic success of Switzerland.
As the analysis has shown, the Swiss experience provides us with a group
of important institutional arrangements working as preconditions for
mitigating or even averting the potentially negative effects of competitive
federalism. In particular, we have recognized intergovernmental
redistribution, interjurisdictional compensation mechanisms, elements of
direct democracy, and loyalty to be crucial for making federalism work. Of
course, this enumeration is not necessarily complete. For example, the
literature also stresses such elements as the power to tax and the assignment
of functions. Last but not least, it seems important that competition should
operate not only between states (cantons) but also between municipalities.
The central feature of the ongoing decentralization in Latin America,
however, seems to be cooperation and coordination. The relatively poor
record of this kind of federalism has produced a great number of critics of
fiscal federalism in general. Differing from those skeptics, in our view the
most important flaw of decentralization in Latin America is the lack of
interjurisdictional competition. In addition to the problem of avoiding a
race to the bottom, there is a group of serious challenges for introducing a
MSee Werner W. Pommerehne, Albert Hart, and Bruno S. Frey, "Tax Morale, Tax Evasion, and the
Choice of Tax Policy Instruments in Different Political Systems," Supplement to Public Finance/Finance Publique
49 (1994): 52-69.
81See Tanzi, Pitfalls on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization.
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properly working system of competitive fiscal federalism in emerging
economies. This generalization seems to be adequate in spite of the fact
that every country has its own institutional peculiarities.
According to von Hayek, institutions are only partly the results of human
design.82 Consequently, we always have to take path-dependencies into
account when proffering policy advice. Even so, the challenges to the
introduction of competitive fiscal federalism are not a reason to abolish
the idea. The empirical and theoretical evidence for positive effects seems
to be too clear. Still, as we have said above, one has to be careful with
advocating a simple "transplant" of the Swiss institutional system to emerging
economies. Especially the "export" of the concept of direct democracy
faces serious problems. Nevertheless, even minor steps toward
democratization, particularly in the realm of tax autonomy, could strengthen
fiscal competition in Latin America. Last but not least, the Swiss systems of
redistribution and interjurisdictional compensation seem to be relatively
simple institutional arrangements that can be transferred easily to other
countries. In this case, the major problem seems to be the political feasibility
in the different countries concerned. In any case, it is surely worth taking
the Swiss experience seriously; it is probably one of the most interesting
and successful laboratories for the working properties of fiscal federalism
in the world.
8!See Friedrich A. von Hayek, "The Confusion of Language in Political Thought," New Studies in
Philosophy, Politics and Economics, ed. Friedrich A. von Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978),
pp. 71-97.

